We examine the effects of firm-specific trading suspensions triggered by price limit hits on three dimensions of market quality: trading activity, return volatility, and price efficiency. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of trading halts on the Italian market (Borsa Italiana) and compare the results under two trading suspension regimes. Our preliminary results reveal mixed evidence. Consistently with previous studies, we find unusually higher levels of both volume and volatility after the halt. Differently from previous studies, we find abnormally higher levels of volume prior to the halt. No significant effect has been found on price efficiency. The nonstandard procedure used by Borsa Italiana to halt trading in case of limit hits allows us to at least partially disentangle the effects of the trading halt itself from the effects of the way in which trading is halted and then resumed after the halt. Type 1 trading halts resume trading with a continuous market, while type 2 trading halts employs a batch call auction to restart trading after the suspension. By comparing type 1 and type 2 trading halts two main results arise. First, type 2 halts always show larger abnormal volume measures than type 1. Second, type 2 halts show lower post-halt abnormal volatility than type 1. This might be explained by the difference in the way the market restarts after the halt. Type 2 allows for wider information dissemination, whereas with type 1 the price discovery process takes place only through the continuous trading. Finally, the call auction reopening procedure of type 2 halts seems to have a stronger cool off effect. 
INTRODUCTION
Unanimous consensus is far from being reached, both in the academia and in the exchange industry, on the actual net benefits of halting the normal trading process in case of extreme market volatility conditions. This type of trading suspension is usually known as price limit hit trading halt. Several papers investigate this issue and provide useful insights, but (understandably) no definitive answer on this point. In the exchange industry as well there is no common view about the usefulness of imposing price boundaries, and securities markets with and without price limit hit triggered trading halts coexist.
Trading halts are non planned interruptions to the normal trading process.
Trading halts can be classified into two main categories: discretionary and non discretionary (or automatic) trading halts. A halt is discretionary when the suspension is called by an exchange official under specific circumstances, expressly defined by the market rulebook. For example, in case of rumors an exchange official may stop trading and simultaneously request the company to provide the market with complete information. A halt is non discretionary when it is inevitably triggered by a specific event, regulated by a market rulebook provision, such as the break of a maximum price variation limit. Price limit hit trading halts usually fall in the second type of suspensions (i.e, non discretionary trading halts).
Market authorities employ trading suspensions to limit "both potential and actual market disorder" (Iosco (2002) ). It is believed that a suspension during abnormal market conditions (a "disordered market") may prevent the degeneration of the market or, if the disordered conditions are already in place, may facilitate the restoration of orderly trading (cooling off effect).
The main reasons given for supporting the opportunity to suspend trading differ between discretionary and non discretionary trading halts. For discretionary trading halts the reasons most frequently mentioned are related to market transparency, illegal trading practices, and exceptional market conditions (Iosco (2002) ). First, in case of a firm-specific information event, a trading halt allows the issuer to release appropriate news, and market participants to assess the impact of such news on market price. Second, the market authority can stop trading if he suspects that some form of fraud or manipulation is being carried out, 1 or the issuer fails to comply with some (material) listing rules. 2 Third, a particular case of discretionary trading halt is when the market authority closes the whole market (i.e., trading is halted for all the securities listed). This may happen in very specific circumstances, as in the case of September 2001 U.S. markets four days closure.
The use of non discretionary trading halts is mainly related to the objective of avoiding the inauspicious effects of erroneous traders conducts. By providing a cooling off period, trading halts allow market participants to evaluate information during times of panic trading "with less emotion" (Iosco (2002) ). Moreover, trading suspensions also allow market authorities to take appropriate actions in order to ascertain the reasons of anomalous price fluctuations. Lastly, in case of orders or quotes erroneously entered into the system, trading halts provide market participants with the opportunity to correct such mistakes without material consequences.
The investigation of price limit effects is particularly important for order driven markets, as the Italian Stock Exchange and many others around the world, and especially for their liquidity. In such markets liquidity comes from the traders who submit standing limit orders. Trading suspensions triggered by price limit hits favor limit order traders. As shown by Harris (1998) , when price is dropping quickly, traders using limit orders to buy a stock suffer from immediate losses when their orders execute as price continue to fall. If price limits are in place, this will not occur and limit order traders may be more willing to offer liquidity under normal circumstances.
1 Fraud or manipulation can happen either "outside" the market (e.g., the company releases false or exaggerate pieces of information) or "inside" the market (e.g., a trader submits orders with size and timing such that other market participants are likely to be induced to trade accordingly). 2 If the conditions that lead to the suspension persist, the market authority can deliberate the delisting of the firm.
The goal of this study is to investigate the effects of alternative mechanisms to halt trading after a price limit hit on several dimensions of market quality. The Italian Stock Exchange (ISE) employs a non standard procedure to stop trading in case of price limit hit. Specifically, when the stock price breaks a prespecified limit for the first time, exchange officials freeze the market for 5 minutes. If trading regularly resumes after the freeze phase, we call this sequence of events "Type 1 limit hit." Alternatively, if a second limit hit occurs after the freeze phase, exchange officials arrange an intraday call auction to find a new equilibrium price. We name this sequence "Type 2 limit hit." In this paper we examine the differential effects of alternative trading suspension mechanisms (Type 1 vs. Type 2) on market activity, price efficiency, and return volatility of individual stocks. 3 This paper differs from previous studies on price limits and trading halts in two ways. First, this study analyzes a two-stage non discretionary trading halt mechanism that works in a significantly different way relative to the price limit and trading halt mechanisms investigated in previous papers. Second, the empirical analysis is based on a new and very detailed data set. Our data set differs from previously used for two reasons. First, we have the official Borsa Italiana (the Italian Stock Exchange Inc.) transcript of all price limit suspensions occurred in a threeyear period. Previous papers on price limits usually infer (with a certain degree of misrepresentation risk) price limit hits by using the algorithm developed by Kim and Rhee (1997) . Second, we use intraday data to capture the immediate effects of price limit suspensions. To the best of our knowledge, previous papers on price limits use daily data. 4 However, this feature does not enable to disentangle the instantaneous effects of price limit hits, and market reactions observed in subsequent days may also possibly include other confounding effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews and discusses the previous research on trading halts. Section III provides some 3 Our analysis exclusively refers to individual security halts. Market-wide trading halts, that can be called by the ISE in case of exceptional events or abnormally large market-wide price movements, are outside the scope of this paper. 4 By contrast, several papers on trading halts employ intraday data (Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) ; Corwin and Lipson (2000) ; Christie, Corwin, and Harris (2002) ). regulatory and institutional details on the mechanics of trading halts on the Italian Stock Exchange. Section IV develops three testable hypotheses related to the effects of trading halts on market quality. Section V provides a description of the data and sample characteristics. Section VI presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED STUDIES
In this Section we provide a summary of selected theoretical models and the main empirical evidence on trading halts.
Supporters of trading suspensions argue that they can serve to reinform market participants, allowing them to assess a new equilibrium price. Greenwald and Stein (1988) argue that when there is the risk of trading on the basis of uninformative prices, traders prefer to refrain from trading. This results in a reduction of market liquidity and, in turn, in a further reduction of prices informativeness. In such conditions, a trading halt can be beneficial in that it restores investors' confidence on the fairness of market prices. In a later study (Greenwald and Stein (1991) ) the same authors develop a model where uncertainty on the importance of uninformed traders drives to excess volatility during the continuous market phase. In this case, trading halts may be beneficial in maintaining the excess volatility at reasonable levels. Kodres and O'Brien (1994) claim that price limits help traders to share risks when some piece of material information is released and, therefore, dampen excess volatility.
Detractors of trading suspensions argue that any kind of market interference should be restricted to the minimum and that halts impose unnecessary liquidity costs on market participants. The discovery of a new equilibrium price is, in their view, far easier and more accurate when trading is permitted rather than when it is suspended. In the model developed by Grundy and McNichols (1989) the revelation of information takes place through trading ("learning-through-trading"). When trading is suspended, potential traders are inhibited from revealing their offer and demand schedules, and this harms the price discovery process.
Moving to empirical studies, in their seminal paper Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) observe price adjustments abnormally large (and proportional to the duration of the trading suspension) over the suspension period, and an anticipatory behavior of stock returns prior to the suspension. They consider such a behavior consistent with a very rapid adjustment to new equilibrium prices. Ma, Rao, and Sears (1989) find a positive contribution to market stabilization of price limits on futures contracts in that, after a price -limit hit, prices tend to stabilize (or even to reverse), return volatility declines and volumes have a tendency to remain stable. Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) , studying the performance of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange during the October 1987 market crash, find that the implementation of trading halts in the form of circuit breakers had no net impact on the overall (negative) return, but smoothed the fluctuations and contributed to reduce the supply imbalance. Thus, circuit breakers served to hedge against "execution price surprises." Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) find that trading halts at the NYSE do not reduce either volume nor price volatility, but merely interfere with the normal trading activity (trading interference hypothesis): the period immediately following a trading halt shows higher levels of both volume and price volatility. They argue that the reason for the documented market behavior is that the batch reopening mechanism employed at the NYSE is less efficient than continuous trading. They find that the reopening price is noisy, and consequently that is counterproductive to stop trading. This leaves open the question if the halt is inefficient, or the reopening mechanism is not appropriate, or both. Corwin and Lipson (2000) study the order flow pattern around NYSE trading halts. Their hypothesis is that, if traders have the opportunity to cancel orders in case of extreme market conditions (thanks to trading halts), they are more willing to submit limit orders during normal market conditions. Corwin and Lipson find that limit order cancellation and submission is exceptionally high during halts and remains high for many hours after the halt. A second important finding is that the order book depth is very thin near the best quotes before, during and after the halts.
This implies a lower quality of the prices and liquidity of the market around trading halts.
A final noisy effect of price limits is the so called "magnet effect" that is observed when prices show a tendency to accelerate toward the bounds as these approach (Arak and Cook (1997); Cho, Russel, Tiao, and Tsay (2003) ). This effect is originated by two, concurring factors: the fear of market illiquidity, and the behavior of market participants. The first effect induces traders to trade more actively than anticipated when there is a risk of being closed out of the market as a consequence of a trading suspension. This in turn increases price variability and, thus, the probability of hitting the limit (Subrahmanyam (1994) ). The second reason is behavioral and states that investors who follow the patterns of prices may step in the market when prices break certain thresholds and will anticipate their trades if they are afraid of being closed out of a trend (Arak and Cook (1997) ). Cho, Russel, Tiao, and Tsay (2003) study the Taiwan Stock Exchange price limit mechanism and find a clearly documented effect in the movement toward the upper limit, while the effect is less clear when the movement is toward the lower limit.
The existing literature does not provide conclusive results on the performance of trading halts. We believe the main reasons for are two. First, there is a very widespread and heterogeneous array of institutional arrangements concerning trading halts and price limits, with reference to what happens when an abnormal change in contract prices is observed (the trigger event), how trading is resumed after a suspension, the duration of the suspension and so on. Moreover trading suspensions have different meanings and non homogeneous consequences in order driven and quote driven markets, 5 and in physical or electronic markets. 6 Second, a conclusive result on the desirability of trading suspension mechanisms could be obtained only if it were possible to contrast the performance of a market with and without suspension, which is clearly impossible.
5 In order driven markets trading suspensions mainly protect limit order traders, while in quote driven markets they protect market makers. 6 As far as trading suspensions are meant to allow market participants to completely exchange the available information during time of market disorder, one should observe different institutional arrangements in case of different transmission technologies (i.e., the halts has to be shorter and triggered by wider limits in case of electronic markets than in case of physical markets).
III. TRADING SUSPENSIONS ON THE ITALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE
Trading on the Italian Stock Exchange (ISE) takes place through a totally electronic screen-based system. The system supports two trading mechanisms: a call auction used to open and close trading, and a continuous auction operating throughout the trading day 7 . An electronic limit order book supports the system in both phases and allows the completion of trades by automatically matching buy and sell (limit and market) orders. The book is open to all intermediaries either to observe the state of the book (price and quantity for all orders on both sides), or to insert orders into the system.
Under particular market conditions, the ISE may alter the ordinary operation of the trading process with different measures 8 : prolonging or delaying the start of one or more phases (e.g., stock X opens at 10:00 a.m.); interrupting the continuous phase and simultaneously activating a call auction; suspending and reactivating trading.
A particular market condition occurs, under the ISE Rules (article 4.10.2), with reference to spot markets, when: a price variation boundary is exceeded (price limit hit), prices or volumes of trading can be deemed as anomalous (anomalous trading conditions), it is necessary to obtain information on a particular market situation concerning a financial instrument or the issuer (news pending halt), technical reasons or other circumstances are such that the regular operation of the market cannot be guaranteed (technical halt). In this study we focus on price limit hit trading halts.
The limit hit suspension mechanism on the Italian market unfolds in a sequence of possibly two steps: a freeze phase and an intraday reopening call auction. The call auction occurrence is conditional upon the output of the freeze 7 The opening phase takes place at different times depending on the market segment: for the bluechip segment, for example, the opening call auction unfolds between 8:00 and 9:15 and the closing call auction between 17:25 and 17:35. The continuous market phase, for blue-chip stocks, takes place between 9:30 and 17:25. 8 In this paper we look at price limits in place on the MTA ("Mercato Telematico Azionario") segment of the ISE, which is the main market segment for trading Italian stocks. For other market phase. As for the first step, during the continuous market, trading is immediately and automatically interrupted for a period of 5 minutes ("freeze phase") when an order that makes the price change by more than 10% relative to the control price 9 arrives on the market. The order that would have made the price exceed the limit is cancelled and the market restarts with the continuous phase, based on the same orders standing on the book as at the halt but the one that triggered it. During the freeze phase traders are not allowed neither to modify (or cancel) previously posted orders, nor to post new orders.
When trading resumes after the freeze phase two possible states of the world may arise: the market works regularly or a second price limit hit occurs. In the latter case, the market is again suspended for 25 minutes and the ISE announces a new call market phase lasting 5 minutes that will end before the expiration of the 25 minutes delay. The intraday reopening call auction follows the same rules as the ordinary opening or closing auctions and therefore market participants may post new orders, or cancel or modify previously posted orders. The orders standing on the limit order book when the halt is declared are automatically transferred to the new opening phase. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the price limit mechanism in effect on the ISE.
The two-stage price limit mechanism (the first with simple freezing of the market, the second with reopening by batch trading) can be interpreted as follows.
When the imbalance between buy and sell orders is such that the market price experiences variations wider than the price boundaries, trading on the financial instrument is suspended in order to purge the market of a possible mistake in order handling (e.g., the order that hit the limit price was erroneously entered into the system), and to warn market participants about the problem. If the first trading suspension is not effective in re-establishing market equilibrium, the second suspension aims at allowing market participants to better assess the state of the segments, the ISE follows basically the same rules, the only thing that changes is the price variation limit, that varies according to the type of security. 9 The control price is the opening auction price or, if an opening auction price has not been determined, the previous day closing auction price.
market (cool off period) and possibly to change their order submission strategies by canceling or modifying previously posted orders and/or by posting new orders.
IV. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

A. Effect on market activity
Price limit hit trading halts, as any other trading suspension, by definition impede trading to take place. If price limit hits trigger the halt when trading is not going to occur, then market activity after the suspension should not be different from that before the price limit were hit.
However, if trading is equally distributed over time this is not going to be the case. When the market resumes after a price limit hit suspension, the trading volume will be higher to compensate for the period of market shut down.
This hypothesis is empirically testable as follows: [Trading interference hypothesis (Kim and Rhee (1997) )]
B. Effect on return volatility
One of the aim of the existence of price limits is to reduce stock returns volatility. First, price limits literally establish boundaries for the price to move within a trading day. Second, they provide time to reassess information during times of market stress (cooling off period [Volatility spillover hypothesis (Kim and Rhee (1997) )]
C. Effect on market efficiency
Proponents argue that price limits allow investors time to react to material news event and allow market participants to search for the new equilibrium price level. Goldman and Sosin (1979) suggest that policies such as price limits may improve market efficiency if there is sufficient price uncertainty, by reducing transitory deviations from fundamentals.
On the other hand, detractors argue that price limits are unnecessary barriers to trading. Since trading stops when limit hits occur, price limits truly represent upper and lower bounds on stock prices. Thus, price limits interfere with the price discovery process. If price limits prevent prices to reach their equilibrium value on the limit hit day, then stocks have to wait until the next trading period to reach the new equilibrium price. As a result, in subsequent trading rounds, the price will continue to move in the direction of the new equilibrium value (price continuation).
Thus by comparing the return series over the pre-halt period with the post-halt return we can identify price reversal or price continuation patterns: the delayed price discovery hypothesis is supported by a pattern of price continuations after the halt, while it is rejected by the observation of a pattern of price reversals.
This hypothesis is empirically testable as follows: limit hits represent about 56% (44%) of the sample. Partitioning the sample by day of the week, an almost monotonically decreasing number of limit hits arise as the week progresses: the highest number of hits occurs on Monday, the lowest on Friday. Table 2 shows the duration of trading suspension for Type 2 limit hits. We classify a Type 2 trading halt as "standard" when, after the first freeze phase (lasting 5 minutes) triggered by a price limit hit, there is a second price limit hit occurring at the tentative restart of the continuous phase and the market reopens with a call auction after a pre-opening phase. During the pre-opening phase, the ordinary rules for the opening clearing price apply. Thus, it may happen that the opening is delayed (i.e., the pre-opening is prolonged) when the tentative opening price exceeds the limits set by the ISE. In such cases, we define a Type 2 with "n pre-opening phases" trading halt. In special cases, the ISE may switch the market to the pre-opening phase immediately after a price limit hit (that is without the tentative restart of continuous trading). In this special case we define a Type 2 "without freeze phase" trading halt. About 80% of the Type 2 trading halts belongs to the standard category, 6% to the Type 2 with 3 re-opening phases, 3% to the Type 2 without freeze phase.
To work with a manageable amount of data, the intraday analysis only refers to a randomly selected subsample of 300 firm-event observations. Because we wish to analyze trading activity and other market quality variables before and after the halts, delayed openings are not considered. For similar reasons, we also exclude halts that were not resolved within one trading day. Cases where the same stock experienced more than one halt on the same trading day were combined into a single event and classified as 'clustered suspensions', as opposed to 'unique suspensions'.
Our final sample includes 123 trading halts.
B. Methodology
We follow the methodology first introduced by Lee et al. (1994) , and then adopted by Corwin and Lipson (2000) and by Christie et al. (2002) , to investigate the intraday effects of NYSE and Nasdaq trading halts.
The Lee et al. methodology is based on the detection of abnormal values of
the variables under investigation. Under this framework, the effect of a trading halt is measured by comparing intraday statistics for a stock experiencing a halt event with the same statistics computed for the same stock in a normal (i.e. non-halt) trading day. We consider a normal trading day as the average non-halt day, where the average is calculated with reference to the data observed 10 days before and 10 days after the halt day (the non-halt period). This procedure controls for security characteristics that may affect the variables under investigation.
To look at intraday effects, we partitioned the halt day (as well as non-halt days) in thirty-minute intervals, which are measured backward from the beginning of the halt to the open of trading for pre-halt periods and forward from the resuming of the trading activity to the end of the trading day for post-halt periods. We provide results for 2 hours prior (4 thirty-minute intervals) the halt and 2 hours after (4 thirty-minute intervals) the halt. 
VI. RESULTS
We first investigate the effects of trading halts on market activity to test the trading interference hypothesis stated in Section IV.A. We consider three measures of trading activity: the number of shares traded, the monetary value of trading, and the number of trades. For each of the three metrics of trading activity we computed the measure of anomaly defined as in [1] to compare trading activity around the limit hit trading halt with ordinary trading activity during non-halt periods. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the three measures on a 4-hour interval around the halt for each market suspension event in our sample.
Full sample analysis reveals that the trading activity is higher than normal both before and after the halt. This result is consistent across all the trading activity measures we considered. Halt days are thus characterized by an abnormally higher trading pressure both before and after the halt. Measures of anomalous trading activity increase as the halt time approaches and decreases, but remains significantly higher, for the half-hour intervals more distant from the halt. In other words, the difference between halt days and non-halt days tends to decay as one departs from the halt time, but it remains significantly positive during the entire intraday period under investigation (ranging up to 8 half-hour periods around the halt).
The median abnormal volume measures display a relatively different pattern in the sense that the highest measure of anomaly is detected in the thirty-minute interval preceding the halt. The abnormally high volume before the halt can be explained both by some form of information leakage as the event that triggers the halt is approaching, and also by a sort of magnet effect (Arak and Cook (1997) ) as market participants tend to anticipate their trades by fear of being crowded out by the declaration of the halt.
When we partition the sample according to the halt type, we find that the abnormal volume statistics are consistently higher, in all sub-periods, for type 2 trading halts than for type 1 trading halts. We also find for type 2 trading halts only evidence of abnormally high volume statistics following the halts. This implies that they prevent trading by rational market participants and partially support the trading interference hypothesis. This hypothesis is indirectly supported also by the differences in abnormal volumes observed for type 1 and type 2 halts: type 1 halts are quickly resolved and the market closure is shorter than in the case of type 2 halts.
Trading activity responds to the lower interference of type 1 halts showing a smaller deviation from a normal trading day.
The second step of our analysis is the investigation of the effects of trading suspensions on return volatility. Market regulators expect that halting the trading when price variations exceed some pre-specified limit can help to reduce "excessive" stock return volatility. However, the effects over return volatility may be simply temporary in that trading halts might prevent immediate price corrections and so simply delay the prompt attainment of a new equilibrium price. In this case, the return volatility can increase when trading resumes.
We tested the null hypothesis that return volatility in the post limit hit period is lower than in the pre limit hit period (over-reaction hypothesis) against the alternative hypothesis that the return volatility in the post limit hit period is higher than or equal to return volatility in the pre limit hit period (volatility spillover hypothesis). Our results (Table 4) show that the intraday abnormal volatility around trading halts is higher after the halt. The abnormal measure of volatility in the posthalt periods is always positive, statistically significant and higher than in the pre-halt period. The hypothesis that the return volatility in the post limit hit period is lower than in the pre limit hit period (over-reaction) can be safely rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis (volatility spillover). Moreover, there is also evidence of a magnet effect in that the volatility tends to increase in the half-hour period before the halt.
When we distinguish between type 1 and type 2 we find similar results:
volatility unusually increases during the post halt periods for both type 1 and type 2 halts.
Finally we focused our analysis on the effects of price limit hit trading halts on market efficiency. Here the competing hypotheses are that the suspension of the trading process can give market participants the time to assess new material pieces of information regarding the suspended stock 13 , whereas, on the other hand, a halt in the trading process may prevent securities prices to attain in the most efficient way their new equilibrium value. We tested the competing hypotheses of delayed price discovery against over-reaction hypothesis (stated in Section IV.C) by comparing the pattern of the post-halt returns with the pattern of the pre-halt returns and defining price continuations when the sign of the post-halt return is the same as the one of the pre-halt return and price reversals when the signs of pre and post-halt returns are the opposite. Evidence of a predominance of price continuation (that is, the halt interferes with the incorporation of information into prices) would support the delayed price discovery hypothesis, while evidence of price reversal could signal the correction of an over-reactive behavior of market participants and thus would support the cool-off hypothesis. Table 5 shows a mixed evidence in that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of reversal is different from 0.5. This result holds both for the full sample and by trading halt type sub-sample. The absence of a significant difference between type 1 and type 2 halts might suggest that any kind of halt, irrespective of its length and of the market reopening procedure (continuous trading versus call auction), cannot correct (but only delay) the "natural" market price discovery process.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we examined the intraday effects of non discretionary trading halts triggered by price limit hits on volume and volatility by comparing statistics computed on a 30-minute basis on the halt day with the same statistics computed for the same stocks in normal trading sessions (non halt days).
Our preliminary results reveal mixed evidence. Consistently with previous studies, we find unusually higher levels of both volume and volatility after the halt (Lee at al. (1994) , Corwin and Lipson (2002) , Christie et al. (2002) ). Differently from previous studies, we find abnormally higher levels of volume prior to the halt.
This implies that we find only limited support for the trading interference hypothesis. The abnormal volatility in the post-halt periods is always positive, statistically significant and higher than in the pre-halt periods. This evidence supports the volatility spillover hypothesis. The abnormal positive volatility in the half-hour interval before the halt is consistent with a form of magnet effect.
The institutional setting of the ISE allows us to at least partially disentangle the effects of the trading halt itself from the effects of the way in which trading is halted and then resumed after the halt. Type 1 trading halts resume trading with a continuous market, while type 2 trading halts employs a batch call auction to restart trading after the suspension. By comparing type 1 and type 2 trading halts two main results arise. First, type 2 halts always show larger abnormal volume measures than type 1. Second, type 2 halts show lower post-halt abnormal volatility than type 1.
This might be explained by the difference in the way the market restarts after the halt. Type 2 allows for wider information dissemination (through the pre-opening phase of the call auction), whereas with type 1 the price discovery process takes place only through the continuous trading. Finally, the call auction reopening procedure of type 2 halts seems to have a stronger cool off effect.
On the basis of our findings we can say that the halt does not completely fulfill the purpose of cooling off the market in extreme volatility circumstances. 
Friday Total
This table presents the frequency of Type 1 and Type 2 non discretionary trading halts by day of the week for the full sample. We classify a trading halt as Type 1 when, after a price limit hit and the following freeze of the market, trading resumes regularly with the continuous market. A trading halt is classified as Type 2 when, after a price limit hit as in Type 1, there is a second limit hit at the restart of the continuous market and trading restarts with a call auction, preceded by a pre-opening phase. 
Table 2 -Duration of Trading Halts
This table presents the duration of the trading suspension in case of Type 2 trading halts for the full sample. We classify a Type 2 trading halt as "standard" when, after the first freeze phase (lasting 5 minutes) triggered by a price limit hit, there is a second price limit hit occurring at the tentative restart of the continuous phase and the market reopens with a call auction after a pre-opening phase. During the pre-opening phase, the ordinary rules for the opening clearing price apply. Thus, it may happen that the opening is delayed (i.e., the pre-opening is prolonged) when the tentative opening price exceeds the limits set by the ISE. In such cases, we define a Type 2 with "n pre-opening phases" trading halt. In special cases, the ISE may switch the market to the pre-opening phase immediately after a price limit hit (that is without the tentative restart of continuous trading). In this special case we define a Type 2 "without freeze phase" trading halt. This table shows summary statistics of the abnormal measures for the number of shares traded, the monetary trading volume, and the number of trades. The abnormal measures are computed on the basis of the halt day values relative to the mean nonhalt days values. Nonhalt days include 10 days before and 10 days after the halt. The halt period extends from the beginningof the halt to the market resuming trade. Thirty-minute prehalt periods are measured backward from the beginning of the halt. Thirty-minute posthalt periods are measured forward from the reopening time. This table shows summary statistics of the abnormal measure for the half-hour return volatility. The abnormal measure is computed on the basis of the halt day values relative to the mean nonhalt days values. Nonhalt days include 10 days before and 10 days after the halt. The halt period extends from the beginning of the halt to the reopening trade. Thirty-minute prehalt periods are measured backward from the beginning of the halt. Thirty-minute posthalt periods are measured forward from the market resuming time. This table shows the frequency of price continuations, reversals, and no change for the full sample and by type of trading halt. We apply a variation of the Kim and Rhee (1997) algorithm. We examine the total return over the prehalt period and compare it with the posthalt return. If the sign of the prehalt return is (not) the same as the sign of the posthalt return the event is classified as price continuation (reversal). Combinations of prehalt and posthalt returns including zero returns are classified as 'no change'. The null hypothesis for the binominal test is that the proportion of the event with the highest relative frequency is 0.5.
Abnormal number of trades
